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Abstract 
 
Cultural policy in Europe is deeply rooted in the Welfare State doctrine that 
has been prevailing during the last half century. Its implementation has gone 
along with the invention and rise of educational policy, social policy and health 
policy. This paper sketches its evolution as a four phase move towards what has 
been emerging as the central dual content of the current public cultural policy: 
preserving and promoting heritage, and bringing the creative industries at the 
core of the so-called knowledge society. The general evolutionary trend shows 
four distinct phases: 1) the creation of a systematic cultural supply policy based 
on a limited definition of culture suitable for public financing and based on a 
vertical concept of democratization by conversion; 2) the gradual decentrali-
zation of public action, which leads to an increasing disparity in its aims and 
functions, and which challenges the initial universalist, top-down egalitarian 
model; 3) a revision of the legitimate scope of public action, which declares 
symbolically obsolete the founding hierarchy of cultural politics, that which 
would oppose high culture, protected from market forces and entertainment 
culture and governed by the laws of the industrial economy; 4) an increasing 
tendency to justify cultural policy on the basis of its contribution to economic 
growth and to the balance of national social diversity, which legitimises the 
regulatory power of public action as well encouraging the expansion of the 
creative industries and the demands for the evaluation of procedures and re-
sults. The last section of this paper moves away from the state centered per-
spective and focuses on the city as the incubator of cultural generativity, in 
order to suggest how a city-centered approach to cultural development chal-
lenges the state-centered doctrine of cultural policy. 
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Cultural policy has undergone major changes over 
the last half century.What I aim to do is first to re-
view the evolution of the European model of cultural 
policy. Yet before investigating evolution, one 
should ask: does such a model exist? My claim is that 
such a model does exist, even if we should not 
overlook significant differences between the various 
european countries. My suggestion is that these dif-
ferences have been far greater before the communist 
system in Eastern Europe collapsed, and before 
dictatorships in Spain and Portugal were overthrown 
in the seventies.  
I shall take as a fundamental premise of my ar-
gumentation that the European model of cultural 
policy is deeply rooted in the Welfare State doctrine 
that has been prevailing during the last half century. 
In fact, cultural policy may be regarded as one of the 
pillars of this doctrine and its implementation, to-
gether with educational policy, social policy and 
health policy.  
I’ll sketch its evolution as a four phase move to-
wards what has been emerging as the central dual 
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content of the current public cultural policy: pre-
serving and promoting heritage on one hand, and 
bringing the creative industries at the core of the 
so-called knowledge society, on the other hand. 
The general evolutionary trend which I will ex-
pound upon shows four distinct phases
3
:  
1) the creation of a systematic cultural supply 
policy based on a limited definition of culture suit-
able for public financing and based on a vertical 
concept of democratization by conversion. 
2) the gradual decentralization of public action, 
which leads to an increasing disparity in its aims and 
functions, and which challenges the initial univer-
salist, top-down egalitarian model;  
3) a revision of the legitimate scope of public ac-
tion, which declares symbolically obsolete the 
founding hierarchy of cultural politics, that which 
would oppose high culture, protected from market 
forces and entertainment culture and governed by the 
laws of the industrial economy;  
4) an increasing tendency to justify cultural policy 
on the basis of its contribution to economic growth 
and to the balance of national social diversity, which 
legitimises the regulatory power of public action as 
well encouraging the expansion of the “creative in-
dustries” and the demands for the evaluation of 
procedures and results. 
Having investigated the European cultural policy 
state model and its evolution, I’ll move away from 
the state centered perspective and focus, in the last 
part of my talk, on the city as the incubator of cultural 
generativity, in order to suggest how a city-centered 
approach to cultural development challenges the 
state-centered doctrine of cultural policy. 
 
1. The Initial Model: Excellence in the Arts  
– the Virtues of Democratization 
 
When culture entered the welfare states’ agenda in 
the 1950s, a simple doctrine quickly formed the basis 
of public action. It consisted of two objectives: pro-
                                                        
3
 In viewing the phases of public cultural action as a series 
of phases in the various European countries, a meticulous 
historical and comparative approach is required to avoid 
lapsing into caricature. Yet it would go well beyond the 
bounds of this study. I can only refer to the details of the 
documentation and works which I have consulted for this 
talk. See Greffe, Pflieger (2009), McGuigan (2004), Poir-
rier, (2000), Rigaud (2001), Ross (2009), Saint-Pulgent 
(2009), Schnapper (2002), Throsby (2001), Urfalino 
(2004), The Economy of Culture in Europe  (2006), 
Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe 
(2009). I may also refer to the final chapter of my book Le 
Travail créateur, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 2009. 
tecting and developing cultural activity, and pro-
viding citizens with equal access to it. Definition of 
culture was homogenous, associated with high cul-
ture, with its hierarchies and classifications and its 
selective renewal and settling principles. Culture 
symbolized a national identity while also claiming to 
embody universal values.  
The arena of public cultural action was defined in 
opposition to the arena of cultural industries and the 
entertainment culture, dominated by market forces. 
However, a history of the arts might also show that 
the market had moved artistic innovation away from 
the academic arena and its state protection and into 
the visual arts. Literature and cinema are mainly 
market-based: innovation finds its ways and its niche 
within that market framework. 
Fundamental public action was overall more cer-
tain of its values than its procedures. Neither Keynes, 
the founder and first Chairman of the Arts Council of 
England, nor French Minister Malraux doubted that 
the guiding principles of public action should be 
excellence and the widest possible democratic par-
ticipation in frequenting works of the greatest artistic 
ingenuity. The situation was the same in the German 
Länder and Northern European democracies when, 
thanks to economic growth, cultural politics began to 
figure as a priority for welfare states.  
 
The expected effects of a supply policy 
How did the policy of supply affect demand be-
haviour? In Northern Europe, there was no doubt 
about the aim: the social stratification of tastes and 
preferences, which creates huge class divisions, 
could be limited. This is the ‘escalator’ model of 
slow ascent: the various social groups stand on 
higher or lower steps, depending on their budgetary 
and educational means, but when growth is strong 
and its fruits efficiently distributed, the stairway 
elevates everyone. Once basic needs are covered 
(food, housing, transport, health) a disproportio-
nately higher amount of expenditure is then directed 
towards higher requirements such as leisure and 
culture, spatial mobility, personal care, domestic 
services, etc. The machinery of the welfare state 
promotes culture as a fundamental right and an es-
sential part of personal and collective growth, rank-
ing it alongside other rights such as education, health 
and social security.  
France and Great Britain’s philosophy relied more 
on the ripple effect of territorial dissemination on 
demand.  
 
How effective has public cultural action been ? 
What do we know about how effective public 
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cultural action has been in lowering cultural con-
sumption inequalities?  
Drawing on existing European research literature 
on public cultural policies and available data, it is 
possible to summarize the issue of efficiency in three 
points:  
 
• there are winning sectors, which attest to the 
success of public action: when looking at cultural 
outings, heritage-related activities rank highest. The 
culture-consuming public is now greater, and comes 
from more socially and geographically diverse 
backgrounds. Without heritage, there would be no 
cultural tourism, something which has considerable 
economic importance. This seems particularly to be 
the case for Southern European countries, whose 
cultural heritage is considerable; 
 
• there are trends within practices, with some 
starting off positively then recently falling off: for 
instance, reading practices and literacy levels have 
long distinguished the Northern European countries, 
where adult education and the network of public 
libraries have historically been the key to local and 
central cultural policy. The recent change in reading 
practice (is a result of the growing competition from 
the growing range of digital technologies; 
 
• finally, there are sectors in which supply has far 
outstripped demand: this is the case for theatre and 
other such live performing arts. These sectors em-
body one of the historical origins of public cultural 
policy throughout Europe, and remain central to 
them. However, these sectors have continued to re-
main restricted, both in terms of the size and social 
diversity of their public. The realm of classical 
concerts and opera remains particularly symbolic of 
the voluntarism which is always necessary, always 
reasserted and always disappointed. To some extent 
this typifies all public action-related dilemmas. 
 
 
2. Decentralization and Decentering 
 
Everywhere in Europe, the supply-centred policy I 
have described increasingly involved local authori-
ties: in Northern Europe and in federally governed 
countries earlier than in Southern Europe.  
My point is the following: by taking into account 
issues of territorial balance and spatial equity, the 
primary definition of public cultural policy action, as 
rooted in a hierarchical and universalistic set of ten-
ets, have gradually been undermined. The involve-
ment of local players fairly quickly prompted the 
question of the definition of culture to be supported. 
The welfare state and its central cultural admini-
stration aimed at persuading and helping local au-
thorities to provide their populations with a coherent 
range of cultural facilities and amenities such as 
libraries, museums, live performing arts venues, art 
and music schools, theatre companies, symphony 
orchestras, opera houses, etc. Yet as this process 
unfolded, local authorities increasingly broadened 
the definition of culture they were willing to supply, 
leading it towards a more anthropological definition 
of cultural identity and diversity, and increasingly 
linking cultural policy to education, urban and social 
policy. 
In the face of the hierarchical classification of arts 
legitimately deserving of public support and the 
glacial pace of changing individual cultural tastes 
and raising attendance for high culture events and 
institutions, radical proponents of a cultural policy 
counter-model proposed instead a re-evaluation of 
popular culture. 
See the Danish case. Denmark created a Ministry 
of Culture in 1961. Here, support for the arts, in the 
limited definition of culture, was at once grounds for 
opposing the populism of those parties hostile to 
public support. Towards the late 1960s, a public 
report recommended adopting a pluralist view of 
culture, working in harmony with local authority 
involvement. In reality, pluralism was closer to a 
default egalitarianism rule than anything else, since 
funding structures are far less flexible than model 
shfits would suggest, due the sunk costs and 
path-dependency of public support schemes. 
The British ‘arm’s length’ model is a completely 
different way of organising public action, but with 
just the same conflicting objectives.  
The lesson to be drawn from that period is the 
following. As public cultural action expands, it feeds 
its differentiation and contestability: the question 
quickly arises as to whether there can only be one 
single, immutable definition of culture governing 
cultural action in the regions or whether, at grass 
roots level, the ‘top down’ public action model ought 
not to be changed for a ‘bottom up’ policy. 
 
 
3. Open borders: Cultural Policy, the Free 
Market, the Economy and the End of 
Monopolies 
  
In the mid-70s, the first oil crisis led to an eco-
nomic downturn which restricted the welfare state 
model to low levels of economic growth. Culture, 
seen as a civilising force, could no longer remain 
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anti-utilitarian and outside the boundaries of market 
forces. This is both the result of an exogenous shock 
and the consequence of the policy’s internal diffe-
rentiation and territorial expansion.  
Externally, the development of the cultural wel-
fare state in Northern Europe was abruptly curtailed, 
owing to the sharp increase in welfare payments 
during a time of rising unemployment.  
Internally, social and welfare democracy had 
created an opening for the deconstruction of hierar-
chies within the arts. The cultural industries had 
undergone a formidable development since the 
1960’s, around the time when the first large-scale 
systematic programmes of public finance for culture 
were implemented. These industries had given rise to 
numerous musical innovations (the birth of pop and 
rock music) since the end of the 1950s, and these 
effervescent adolescent sub-cultures were epito-
mized by values of cultural, critical, hedonistic and 
anti-establishment liberalism, in stark contrast to 
what was denounced as high brow culture, trans-
mitted in a quasi-hereditary manner. How could it be 
that consumption of culture was so strong in the 
commercial sector and yet so clearly socially unba-
lanced in the subsidized sector? As popular culture 
began to be reassessed, rigid hierarchization of the 
cultural sphere seemed no longer legitimate..  
The utility of culture and of public action took on a 
new form. The economic and industrial valuation of 
cultural production, the impact on local development 
and urban regeneration, the development of corpo-
rate sponsorship and the diversification of resources 
were the guiding tenets that Thatcher’s government 
imposed on the Keynesian philosophy of the Arts 
Council in the UK. 
In France, the coming together of cultural policy 
and economic rationality took on an opposite profile. 
The aim of growing interventions to support tradi-
tional arts and heritage was maintained, to the extent 
that there was increasingly centralized expenditure 
by the Ministry of Culture on Paris and its sur-
rounding area, with unprecedented support of large 
scale architectural and heritage works. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Culture’s scope grew beyond 
and in an opposite direction to its original domain, 
into the production of the cultural industries and the 
deployment of artistic forms into markets of mass 
consumption which would maintain their success 
and pace of innovation. Public action, accused of 
failing to become more democratic, understood that 
its context was changing.  
Note however that nowhere has public action been 
prone to massive redirections of spending towards 
the domains of organised cultural production in ac-
cordance with free-market competition. It is sym-
bolic, but also and above all regulatory. The example 
which is valid across the whole of Europe is the 
political and economic fate of the audiovisual in-
dustry. The monopoly of public control over televi-
sion came to an end in the different countries at 
various dates between the mid-1970s to the end of 
the 1990s. Public action has indeed shown itself to be 
effective when it developed a regulatory mechanism 
of contracting and control by independent authori-
ties, which set a framework for the expansion of the 
audiovisual industry through maintaining or pro-
moting political, religious, cultural and linguistic 
diversity. Public action also induced  the television 
industry to finance the film industry, whose produc-
tion and heritage it could exploit, by setting quotas to 
protect national production in a market dominated by 
the American industry.  
Regulatory action is one in a set of three principles 
building the new rationale for cultural policies.  
The second one was call for the social and eco-
nomic benefits of culture, which have been visible 
since the 1970s in the behaviour of large as well as 
small cities. 
Thirldy, it was essentially in the 1980s that the 
first means of assessing cultural policy were devised. 
Evaluating and measuring the effects of cultural 
policy is too big a subject for me to explore here. I 
will merely state that the efforts to do so have taken 
differing approaches: analysis of the economic im-
pact of culture and the support to its provision, study 
of the spillovers of local spending, the application of 
tools for public policy evaluation and expenditure 
rationalisation to culture, and the international 
evaluation of national public policies. 
 
 
4. Cultural Policy, Industrial Policy and the 
Knowledge Society: from the Cultural In-
dustries to the Creative Industries 
 
At this point, let me restate a key argument 
which can be seen as the leading thread of my 
presentation.  
As the social and economic justification for public 
cultural action has been through a series of adjust-
ments, the very definition of culture itself has 
changed. We are familiar with the distinction be-
tween a narrow definition of culture, based initially 
on the high arts, then incorporating all of the high 
arts and their popular forms (in music, literature, 
dance, etc.), and an anthropological, relativistic de-
finition. On the other hand, bringing the cultural 
industries into the sphere of public policy moves it in 
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another direction entirely, leading to a more 
far-reaching political revision.  
The situation evolved rapidly when the flag was 
flown for the creative industries. Cultural policies in 
most European countries have adopted this requali-
fication of one part or even, as in the United King-
dom, the entirety of their field of intervention. The 
movement started in Australia which promoted the 
idea of a ‘creative nation’ in the early 1990s. This 
revamped cultural policy had two main objectives:  
 
1) to work towards the complete recognition of 
multiculturalism, and  
2) to promote the creative industries, whilst moving 
towards the information and communication tech-
nologies sector’s industrial policy.  
 
In Europe, this doctrine was revised and imple-
mented by Tony Blair’s government from 1997 on-
wards. The policy implemented in the UK distin-
guishes between two areas of intervention, namely 
heritage and the creative industries. The latter in-
clude architecture, music, live performance, pub-
lishing, the art and antiques market, music, arts and 
crafts professions, television and radio, film and 
video, advertising, design, fashion, video games, 
software and IT services. 
The argument is simple: culture as covered by 
policy materialises as goods, services, performances 
and practices. Under this definition, culture is an end 
product and its consumption should be as geo-
graphically and socially equitable as possible, in 
order that individual satisfactions coincide with so-
cial benefits. 
In redefining it to place greater emphasis on crea-
tivity, culture, in the sense used here, becomes a 
sector in which qualities which are also a resource 
for the economy as a whole are sought and imple-
mented. For this reason, activities which can be de-
fined as both utilitarian and functional forms of 
production are associated with the arts: advertising, 
fashion, industrial and software design being good 
cases in point.   
And creativity should be seen as a generic part of 
the inventiveness common to all economic activities 
which constantly require knowledge, its unceasing 
renewal and a technical approach to the production 
process to ensure innovation.  
Cultural policy thus becomes an “industrial” pol-
icy. This new sectoral identity of public action has 
been adopted in Denmark and in Sweden (the strat-
egy was entitled Culture and experience economy, 
2003) in the Netherlands (Our creative potential, 
2005), the German Länder, in Lithuania and in Pol-
and. 
I’ll underline the main shifts this reshuffling of 
cultural policy is the product of. 
 
1) Equating culture with creativity occurs in societies 
growth model is based on technological innovation 
and on raising the country’s knowledge capital. 
 
2) The public management of culture and the arts 
should no longer be an evidence-free zone shielded 
from measurement of its contribution to economic 
and social development.  
 
What can be found in this statistical mapping 
which might provide the economic value of the cul-
tural sector resides in its contribution to GDP, in 
added value, in growth rates, in the proportion of 
jobs directly or indirectly related to the sector and in 
the quality of these jobs, in the characteristics of 
businesses and micro-businesses and in their com-
petitiveness (productivity and profitability) and in 
the volume and structure of cultural consumption 
expenditure in household budgets. However, the 
argument that culture is also an intermediate good 
also leads to the attempt to pinpoint all of culture’s 
indirect contributions to the economic growth and 
social cohesion of countries, territories and towns.  
One simple measure of this indirect contribution is 
that cited by local authorities since the 1970s: the 
leveraging effect of available cultural goods and 
services on the development of local tourism and on 
urban regeneration. Valuing the exact knock-on ef-
fect of tourism has long been the subject of contro-
versy, when the exact returns on cultural investments 
were being examined and compared with alternative 
investments. 
It is also significant that one of the main outcomes 
of action supportive of the so-called creative indus-
tries was the proliferation of urban regeneration 
schemes and the redevelopment of industrial sites 
within major urban areas. Examples abound: Hel-
sinki, Amsterdam, Manchester, Lille, Marseille, 
Lodz, Barcelona, Dublin, London and Milan to name 
but a few. Similarly, for medium-sized cities the 
emergence of ‘creative clusters’ has provided a 
possible response to the competing draw of large 
urban areas for artists and cultural enterprises.  
Another indirect contribution lies in the fact that 
the cultural industries are industries of content. Their 
work has sustained the development of information 
and communication technologies. the supply of 
musical, audiovisual and information content con-
stituted the best loss-leading product strategy to 
speed up the household adoption of technological 
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goods and to quickly change consumption patterns.  
The most elusive indirect contribution is that of 
“cultural vibrancy” as celebrated by the British cul-
tural policy. Vibrancy means a power of attraction 
over multiple sectors of the economy and at various 
social levels. The thinking behind this is not new. 
What is new is the attempt to calibrate it, and comes 
from economic thinking on endogenous growth and 
on self-sustainment through creative and innovative 
impulses. Creative indices are offered to public and 
private bodies to encourage the emergence of a new 
social ecology. Academic works offer to enrich na-
tions’ accounting tools by constructing a gauge of the 
cultural value of all social and economic realities, 
and to contribute to the definition of sustainable 
development policies.  
 
3) The third evolution concerns employment in 
the cultural sector.  
 
One of the arguments of the creative industries’ 
policy is the consecration of key values associated 
with creativity: a flexible and compliant personal 
approach, an appetite for risk, the ability to cope with 
the unexpected, lateral and intuitive thinking, the 
championing of diversity within teams. What do the 
jobs and employment markets which promote such 
qualities look like? Numerous studies have been 
done, and all of them highlight the disparity between 
the vigorous growth of this employment sector, 
which is far higher than that of the service industry, 
and the individual situation of those in the job mar-
ket. Educational qualifications are above average but 
there are huge inequalities in earnings, as shown by 
the Paretian profile of their distribution (four fifths 
of earnings and amounts of work are enjoyed by less 
than one fifth of professionals), and individuals, 
however qualified, more frequently than elsewhere 
cycle between short-term employment, unemploy-
ment and side jobs.          
Ironically enough, cultural policies have had a 
spectacularly successful effect on cultural availabil-
ity and encouraged the rapid growth of professionals 
working in the cultural sector, but essentially have 
been able to offer stable employment only to ad-
ministrative and technical employees of artistic or-
ganisations and bureaucratic central and local cul-
tural institutions and those various professions built 
around the artistic supply side (those involved in 
teaching, organisation, intervention, conservation, 
dissemination of art and culture). 
 
 
5. Creative Undertakings in their Urban 
Context: Growth, Inequality and Globa-
lization 
 
Cultural policy models, however different they 
may be, always deal with the question of hegemony 
of one or a few leading cultural centers at the na-
tional level.  
One actual dilemma is the balance between the 
ideal of cultural democratization, which advocates a 
more egalitarian distribution of high culture, both at 
the societal and at the spatial level, and the efficiency 
rule, which tends to favor - with higher rates of 
public cultural investment - the cities that bring 
prestige to the country and give it a top rank in in-
ternational cultural life.  
At a nation level, a usual social welfare function 
implies that inequality in income and in various 
kinds of ressources should be reduced. In essence, 
this implies a more egalitarian distribution of human 
capital. Human capital development (mainly through 
a rise in average educational level) translates into 
rising cultural consumption and rising demand for 
cultural amenities, leveraging therefore increasing 
supply of culture.  
However, things go different at a local level. Spa-
tial inequality, with a few urban metropolitan areas 
and cities dominating the economic and demographic 
scene, has proven itself as a means to drive the 
connection between human capital and growth. In a 
nutshell, the ‘agglomeration economy’ or ‘demand 
for urban density’ argument claims that returns to 
skills (productivity) and to creative undertakings 
(innovativeness) correlate highly with the size of the 
city workers and consumers live in.  
Why this is so has been investigated extensively 
for about three decades, especially by economists 
and economic geographers like Edward Glaeser in 
his numerous publications issued since the 1990’s
4
.  
Large cities serve as forges of human capital and 
incubators of innovation, due to human capital spil-
lovers: individual productivity appears to depend on 
the density of smart and well educated people, due to 
higher inventiveness generated by higher and faster 
exchanges of ideas, and due to the concentration of 
workers in those industries requiring high levels of 
human capital and high demand for innovation. 
Accordingly, dominant cities specialize in business 
services - law, finance, accounting and consulting - 
but also in creative industries’ production of goods 
and services (arts, entertainment, media, fashion, 
design, advertising). Occupational breakdown of 
workforce composition according to the size of the 
                                                        
4
 See in particular Glaeser, Kolko, Saiz (2001). 
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metropolitan area and to the dominance of world 
cities, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 taken from Mar-
kusen and Schrock’s 2006 paper provides a glimpse 
of this urban specialization and generativity process. 
The increasing trend towards spatial concentration 
of cultural workers within major urban areas or ur-
ban districts is well documented as well the agglo-
meration economy pattern that fits especially well 
with the production and work process in the arts, 
with its entrepreneurial base of micro-businesses, 
flexible and interdependent resource-sharing net-
works and with its working population whose 
structural surplus makes it possible to organise a 
system which work on a project-by-project basis. 
Less easy to measure are the returns to density on 
the cultural demand side. Cultural consumption 
correlates with income and educational level. Once 
controlling for those factors, there seems to be a net 
cutural amenities supply effect. 
Taken together, the several factors of an agglo-
meration-driven cultural growth lead to a conclusion 
that hurts the basic philosophy of a nation-level de-
fined cultural policy. Major centers concentrate the 
best jobs, high levels of innovation  and high-stants 
Table1.Selected occupational group specialization by metro size class,2000 (quoted from Markusen and Schrock, 2006, p. 1308) 
 
Notes: Occupations shown exhibit relatively high rates of skewness across US metros. Specialisation index of 1 indicates 
equal share of occupation in size class as in overall economy. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, 2000. 
 
Table2. Occupational specialisations, by group, US world cities and all metros, 2000 (quoted from Markusen and Schrock, 2006, p. 
1309) 
 
Source:see Table1. 
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consumption, but do also generate spatial and social 
class polarization, with large numbers of migrants 
attracted and housing prices distribution even more 
skewed than wage distribution of the population of 
residents. Moreover, major centers are likely to be 
more densely connected to each other across the 
world, and to build a tight network of world cities, as 
shown in numerous recent studies
5
 (Alderson and 
Beckfield, 2004; Derudder, Taylor et al., 2010). 
Table 3 above, quoted from Derudder et al.’s  paper, 
lists the 20 most connected cities in the World city 
network defined by Derudder, Taylor and their re-
search team. That network structure is a most dis-
tinctive way to secure and improve urban economic 
and social dominance in the era of globalization.  
 
                                                        
5
 See in particular Alderson, Beckfield (2004) ; Derudder, 
Taylor, Ni, De Vos, Hanssens, Bassens, Huang, Witlox, 
Shen, Yang (2010). 
 
Conclusion 
What has notably emerged from my investigation 
is that local, regional and national cultural policy 
schemes are likely to increasingly differ with respect 
to how they set their respective priorities. A 
state-centered policy has mainly an egalitarian  
concern. Yet inequality may boost creativity and 
cultural generativity up to the point where it gene-
rates increasing social costs. A major city’s artistic 
prestige and cultural development  may benefit the 
whole country’s prestige, yet at the expense of cities 
competing with it to develop. Multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism may be key ingredients of a diver-
sity-driven creativity, yet at the price of potentially 
increasing social segregation and polarization.  
These are major dilemmas cultural policies have 
to adress when it comes to the net contribution that 
creative undertakings and, in a less trendy phrasing, 
human capital accumulation provide to enhance 
economic growth and social welfare, as well as to 
Table3. The 20 most connected cities in the WCN in 2000 and 2008 (quoted from Derudder et al., 2010, p. 1868) 
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ensure dominance in the globalization process. In a 
sense, the emphasis on creativity and creative in-
dustries has gained ground in the public cultural 
discourse and agenda as a way to narrow the gap 
between the top-down approach of the 
state-centered, rather egalitarian cultural policy 
doctrine, and the bottom-up approach of spatial ag-
glomeration-driven generation and exchange of ideas 
and increasing returns to skills in the knowledge 
economy.   
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